Since the inception of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 and before that, Iraq is beset by the effects and influence of the families of the (noble) Religious and tribal and feudal and financial affiliation have the clout and wealth and succession, and in the most critical junctures played these families exceptional roles contributed to the rebuilding of Iraq concept as political concrete. Despite the loss of Nuri al-Maliki in one year the posts of Prime Minister and Vice President of the Republic, but the man is trying hard to find a foothold for his family in the Iraqi political scene, to establish a precedent, in conflict with the viewpoint of the world of the great Iraqi meeting late on the pink. Maliki, who confirms close to him that the most important causes of the deep differences with its partners, the Kurds and the Shiites returning to his sense of inferiority complex about all of Ammar al-Hakim, the grandson of the Shiite cleric Mohsen al-Hakim, who is the last reference to the Shiite community nicknamed Imam Mujahid, and Muqtada al-Sadr, who belongs to the family dressed Faisal I King Iraq crown in the twenty-third of August 1921, and the son of Massoud Barzani, the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, and Ayad Allawi and Ahmed Chalabi, the two scions of houses Baghdadi combine science and wealth.
It has been paid to this inferiority complex thrown his in-laws and cousins and nephews of his brothers in the parliamentary elections and mocked them all the possibilities of the state and the Dawa Party, too,
Vhakqgua win, even in areas not setting foot days, and lost big leaders of the Dawa Party. Maliki hopes to be the nucleus of his family that they wanted her to stand on an equal footing with the families and houses of ancient Iraq, which played a positive role in enlightening and transitional stages in the economic and intellectual renaissance areas before and after the founding of the Iraqi state.
It seems that families place in the standard concrete Iraqi situation and Tjsidadtha, not something an emergency or artificial, Formation and Iraq and social legacy and culture would do well to long that window status of this limit (the noble families), which has controlled the fate of Iraq so far without exception affecting other factors. Despite all of the profound changes that have swept the world it has been the role of these families a prominent and noticeable, and find the shadows of their effects already visible in the political decision-making, knowing that these families exposed to the contraction of its impact and its political role and decline, when the state is strong and the influence of political parties in the country moving.
The revolution of the twentieth most image embodiment of the features families influential religious or tribal or economic in the composition of the features and content of the revolution, but none of these families did not (touchstone) capable of the heart of the political balances is crucial because of the political nature of that stage and privacy and distributes the pillars of power, especially the presence of British occupation, which in the age of most of the Iraqi state, which extends to contracts, failed on the composition of a mass political movement affiliated, with the exception of the Kurdish nationalist movement led Alborzanah family and less to the families of al-Hakim and al-Sadr extent in varying historical periods.
The year 2003 was the embodiment Matlaha Typically the rule of families and clout, but the scenario and directed by commensurate with the requirements of the new stage where the mighty acts of the stronger (larger) shallowly devil who deal with the Iraqi situation, which Atgmha fixed rules. In this circumstance raging these families re-emerged, and was able to overcome the traditional role that was played in the past when she was standing a distance behind red painted her carefully border, but the New Testament given momentum has not dreamed of in the impact and effectiveness, based on the conduct pragmatic in tune with the concepts of democracy and its applications formalism in Iraq.
But is Maliki can achieve this dream, or that this dream will become a disaster for him, and perhaps be a reason to end the political future?! .. Years of the rule of al-Maliki, the eight I have some features of what might be called idiomatically (b schizophrenia contradictory positions), especially when checking in nature and pattern differences and how to dealing with the crises and problems provoked by his allies and his opponents, ranging from Iyad Allawi, the winner of the 2010 elections and Maliki could circumvent the judicial decision, and then his differences with Osama Nujaifi, Speaker of Parliament, and before the deep differences with Moqtada al-Sadr and the Sadr movement, in addition to his differences with Kurdistan region, down to dealing with the Sunni provinces Almentvdh demands, and finally what happened and is happening in Fallujah and Anbar.
In all the crises that Astunaha Maliki was always harbored the opposite of what he says publicly, waiting for the right opportunity that enables him to pounce on his opponents and his allies, in a way reflect the character concerned and authoritarian careless of the other, has been demonstrated so clearly on two occasions, namely: Maliki's refusal to fulfill the implementation of Arbil power-sharing agreement , which it was supposed to be no national government can bind Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs together, and increased tensions with Iraqi Kurds. And the second dealing with the crisis, calling demonstrations Anbar b (bubble), but Malbut that he became the blower. When Coker intensification of the war, have begun to offer concessions in order to stop the military operation in Al-Anbar, Fallujah is not bloodshed, but to preserve the face of the power represented by al-Maliki, which indicate all the facts and data on the Anfradrith its uniqueness and capabilities of running the country.
Perhaps the first to warn of the uniqueness and the beginnings of a trend shift towards dictatorship with al-Maliki, are Shiites allies, as Shiite MP Sabah al-Saadi warned that, since 2011, he went to the al-Maliki is preparing to devote to the role of family members in the consolidation of his power. She drew Saadi's comments, which Sheikh generalized view of Najaf, which closed its doors at large Iraqi politicians since mid-2012 until the end of the rule of al-Maliki reference, and even went further, calling for the need for change, in order to prevent the outbreak of new sectarian strife, would cause a mandate Maliki third.
And based on the viewpoint of the Shiite authority in that, despite all the Iranian pressure, to a famous statement made by al-Maliki defined himself, when he said: (First I Shiite and secondly I am Iraqi, and thirdly I am an Arab and fourthly I call) Party member, a speech is a reference into, an invitation to the escalation of sectarian conflict in the country that has suffered the scourge of war for many years. On the other side of reference that al-Maliki found working at full power, for his personal benefit and not to build a nation, in order to devote his power and influence of his family in the Iraqi political scene, through about 100 consultant working Bmeith, most of them his relatives and cousins, part of a plan (shadow cabinet) to seize all the authorities.
According to sources close to the reference Najaf, they have a reference plenty of evidence suggest that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is a threat that could lead to inflame sectarian violence, since the 2010 general elections, has become more repressive, and manipulated the Iraqi security forces to serve its own interests, and created a rejection Sunni growing to its practices using Shiite political support for personal gain.
And supported the human rights reports issued by the US State Department, Amnesty International, and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), evidence of the Shiite authority, confirm documents and numbers Maliki sought to perpetuate his power and influence, through his insistence on the suppression and the dimensions of Iraq's Sunnis to participate actively during his second term .
It is said that Nuri al-Maliki, 64, belongs to a family of modest means live Jnajh village in the district of the Indian helm (Touirij), was chosen as a compromise candidate for prime minister in 2006, after the rejection of the Kurds to take Ibrahim al-Jaafari presidency of the Iraqi government, in the wake of the 2005 elections and includes Maliki's office The official addition to his son, Ahmed, Srah and Yasser Hussein, and his wife's brother Ali al-Moussawi, media adviser, as well as the children of his brothers and cousins. In addition to these there Brigade (57 private) that form to be assigning Brigade (56) and Maj. Gen. (54), for the protection of al-Maliki, but it differs that includes elements of the village Jnajh the birthplace of al-Maliki.
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